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ABSTRACT
This paper describes a case study in which a method for forensic analysis of
control was applied to resolve probative technical issues in a legal action. It
describes one instance in which the analysis was successfully applied without
challenge, addresses the details of most of the different facets of the analysis
method, and demonstrates how such analysis provides a systematic approach to
using technical methods to address legal issues as a case study.
Keywords: Turing capability, control, digital forensics, case study
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Laws such as [1] and [2] are used to assert that a criminal or civil violation has
potentially taken place when a suspect acts so as to "knowingly and without
permission" "access" a computer system and "intentionally cause damage", or
similar language. Technical questions for the digital forensic evidence (DFE)
examiner include, without limit, whether or not such a claim is (1) possible in a
particular situation, (2) (in)consistent with the available traces, and (3) attributable
to the suspect or others. A detailed method for analysis in these situations was
provided in [3] and is applied in this case study.
The matter at hand
In the case at hand, Plaintiff accused Defendant of taking control of Plaintiff's
computer as part of efforts undertaken to send unsolicited commercial email to
Plaintiff's systems. The claims asserted, in essence, that Defendant, in sending
unwanted electronic mail messages, violated statutes by sending undesired
electronic mail messages. In doing so, the claim asserted that:
Defendant knowingly sent or caused to be sent electronic mail
messages, without Plaintiff's permission.
In doing so, Defendant caused a program under Defendant's direct or
indirect control to access or cause access to Plaintiff's computer(s).
In doing so, Defendant caused Plaintiff damage when disk space,
computer time, and other resources were consumed as a side effect of
the software that handled these messages.
Thus, under various laws unrelated to the laws regarding unsolicited commercial
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email, Defendant was suing Plaintiff.
Background on the analysis method
As described in [3], and using terminology therefrom, the examiner evaluating
such a claim, must consider whether and to what extent the claims are (1) possible
given the circumstances asserted, (2) (in)consistent with the traces, and (3)
attributable to Defendant.
The notion of “control” is introduced, [3] in part, to help deal with issues of mens
rae. The notion is based on the concept that to be in violation of such a statute, a
party must have at least two things; (1) the ability to act so as to express intent,
and (2) the ability to have that expressed intent carried out. Without these two
elements, asserting that a party knowingly and intentionally caused something to
take place is problematic. The overarching analysis methodology of [3] is outlined
here, and is the only methodology we are aware of for forensic analysis of control
today (numbering added):
0 No control (evidence refutes violation) ٔ
0.1 No syntax to express identified intent (the act is thus outside the
syntactic control envelope) +
0.2 No authority to carry out intent (the act is thus outside the semantic
control envelope)
1 Control (evidence supporting violation)
1.1 Direct +
1.1.1 Special purpose mechanism in normal use ٔ
1.1.1.1 Acts within the control envelope *
1.1.1.2 Traces evidence use of syntax *
1.1.1.3 Traces evidence semantic effect
1.1.2 Special purpose mechanism exceeded ٔ
1.1.2.1 Evidence mechanism(s) to exceed *
1.1.2.1.1 Uncovered path +
1.1.2.1.2 Exploited weakness
1.1.2.2 Traces indicate envelope exceeded *
1.1.2.3 Acts in recursive control envelope *
1.1.2.4 Evaluate for enclosing envelope
1.1.3 General purpose mechanism in normal use ٔ
1.1.3.1 Acts within the control envelope *
1.1.3.2 Traces evidence use of syntax *
1.1.3.3 Traces evidence semantic effect
1.1.4 General purpose mechanism exceeded
1.1.4.1 Evidence mechanism(s) to exceed *
1.1.4.1.1 Uncovered path +
1.1.4.1.2 Exploited weakness
1.1.4.2 Traces show envelope exceeded *
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1.1.4.3 Acts in recursive control envelope *
1.1.4.4 Evaluate for enclosing envelope
1.2 Indirect
1.2.1 Indirect mechanism identified as within a new control envelope
AND 1.2.2 Apply above analysis in new envelope
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we will refer to these elements of the
analytical framework by placing them in curly brackets (e.g., {1.1.3.1} indicates
“Acts within the control envelope” for a “general purpose mechanism in normal
use”). “~” is used for “not shown” (e.g., {~1.1}) and ! for refutation (e.g.,
{!1.1.4.1.1} → shown false).
Attribution to source is also required to demonstrate a violation by any particular
party, if and only if control has been established, and is beyond the scope of [3] or
this paper.
Additional background literature
Analysis of control for forensic purposes is problematic for several reasons.
Perhaps the most problematic overall issue is that demonstrating causality in a
definitive way from traces would require require demonstrating that the envelope
of prior state and input sequences to the relevant finite state automata that could
produce the available traces are such that the only consistent explanation is the
identified causal chain. This is usually infeasible without complete traces or
equivalent partial traces because digital space converges with time.[16] Complete
traces are essentially never available in modern systems.[16] Various
reconstruction approaches have been used to demonstrate feasibility of a causal
chain [7][12][14] leading to particular traces and use of reduced state
representations have been used to try to us incomplete traces to restrict prior state
and input envelopes [13], none of these are currently computationally feasible for
real world situations such as the ones at issue in this matter.
The approach that may be taken to establish some level of viability for a legal
theory asserting taking control is to produce traces adequate to demonstrate a
feasible taking of control through reconstruction.[3] In this approach, existing
traces are driven forward in time through a reconstruction that has adequate
fidelity regarding the relevant factors to show that the traces are consistent with
the legal theory. [7][12][13][14] Of course these reconstruction approaches are
subject to challenges that demonstrate trace and/or event inconsistencies between
the reconstruction and the totality of evidence in the case, as well as challenges
based on all of the assumptions of the reconstruction and alternative
reconstructions.[3]
An alternative to full reconstruction is a logical analysis that is adequate to
demonstrate what has to be demonstrated. For example, we would hope that most
experts would agree that, subject to some reasonable additional constraints, (A1)
the root user in a Unix environment can place any desired bit sequence in any user
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file. While such consensus may not be present in many situations, [16] analytical
approaches largely depend on it and it will be assumed here.
At the end of the day, since no claim of taking control is likely to be fully
demonstrable from available evidence, and certainly is not in most modern realworld systems, the issue must be settled in terms of partial traces that create
evidence supporting each side of the issue.[3] For example, even if a complete
causal chain from a source to a target is not available, there may be partial traces
demonstrating the presence of activities at a source (e.g., a recording of
keystrokes at a user workstation) and effects of such activities at a destination
(e.g., logs of activities that would normally result from those same keystrokes
being applied at the target at the same time frame and in the same sequence) that
may be adequate to establish control to some level of certainty or quality.
Based on the identified consensus assumption (A1), we might reasonably
conclude that for the identified root user, {1.1.3} applies to any activity that root
user would perform on their own system. {1.1.3.1} A stronger demonstration of a
particular act (e.g., deleting a file) would be the presence of traces indicative of a
particular command to perform that act (e.g., “rm /etc/passwd” in the log of
console commands),{1.1.3.2} and traces of the results of that command that are
consistent with that act. (e.g., no such file present) {1.1.3.3} We might then
reasonably
come
to
a
logical
conclusion
that
{1.1.3.1}*{1.1.3.2}*{1.1.3.1}→{1.1.3}→{1.1}→{1} and that the actor logged
in as the root user appears to have had control and performed the act.
In such cases the weight of the accumulated evidence associated with traces and
events, assuming relevance, reliability, and other similar things could be shown,
would presumably be adequate to be presented to the trier of fact. Similar
evidence by the opposing side would have a similar threshold of admissibility and
the trier of fact would be left to decide the issues. For example, if traces normally
present are missing, this would make the reliability of the claims more dubious,
particularly if the reconstruction produced them and the traces from the other
party did not.
Suppose, for example, that the accused individual claims that they were elsewhere
at the time and that facility logs kept by an independent special purpose system
indicate that the individual was elsewhere at the time and no such records indicate
that they were present at the location of the console of the computer at issue at the
time. The individual might reasonably claim that the facility logs showed they
were elsewhere, and since that they don't have the ability to produce false logs
from the normal user interface ({~1.1.1.1} → {~1.1.1}), and no evidence was
present
that
those
logs
were
acting
improperly
({~1.1.2.1}*{~1.1.2.2}→{~1.1.2}), and since this is a special purpose system
({~1.1.3} * {~1.1.4}), it is reasonable to conclude that the accused had no direct
control over the facility logs ({~1.1.1} * {~1.1.2} * {~1.1.3} * {~1.1.4} →
{~1.1}).
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Presumably, this would be admitted to demonstrate the innocence of the accused.
But the accuser might then assert that there are other ways to get around such
mechanisms, including trading badges with someone else. {1.2} In this new
scenario, a new control envelope is present {1.2.1} and the above analysis can
then be repeated within this new control envelope. In the new claimed control
envelope, the facility log operates normally but the mechanism's intended use is
asserted to be exceeded {1.1.2} by an exploited weakness {1.1.2.2} by the
accused and their alleged partner. Traces are present of the excess {1.1.2.2} in the
presence of the alleged partner in the location with the console the acts are within
the recursive control envelope for the partner and the accused ({1.1.1.1} *
{1.1.1.2} * {1.1.1.3} → {1.1.1} for both working together → {1.1.2.3} *
{1.1.2.4}), and thus {1.1.1} → {1.1}(indirect) → {1.2} → {1}, and the violation
is supportable by available traces. However, the “evidence” part of {1.1.2.1} is
weak without some corroboration of the partnership or the acts.
CASE DETAILS
Specific claims and basis
In the matter at hand, [8] specific claims were made with regard to Defendant's
sending or causing to be sent, electronic mail messages. In particular, and without
limit, those claims included (in pertinent parts and in summary):
1. Violations of California Business and Professions Code 17529.5 - The
claimed basis being the allegation that (a) Plaintiff suffered actual damages
by receiving the alleged emails, ... (d) Plaintiff's servers were forced by
Defendants' intentional acts to spend at least 20 times more time processing
Defendants' alleged emails used storage space, used bandwidth, and used
more workstation storage and processing time than they otherwise would
have had to spend, (e) Plaintiff's workstation suffered degraded performance
by Defendants' acts, (f) Plaintiff had to spend time before loading alleged
emails into his workstation to read and process the alleged messages, ... (h)
Defendants forced Plaintiff to spend time sending and receiving responses to
emails in order to try to stop further emails, and (i) Plaintiff suffered damages
as a result of these alleged acts.
2. [Redacted - irrelevant to these issues]
3. Trespass to Chattels - The claimed basis being that (a) Defendant took
control over Plaintiff's servers and workstations without authorization, (b)
instructions sent by Defendants caused Plaintiff to be unable to access, read,
or send desired email messages, (c) Defendants forced Plaintiff's server to use
resources, memory, and disk space and that during that time computers were
unable to perform tasks that Plaintiff desired them to perform, (d) Defendants
forced Plaintiff to perform more computer system maintenance and
monitoring to reduce the risk of data loss, and (e) Plaintiff suffered damages
as a result of Defendants' actions.
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4. California Penal Code 502 - The claimed basis being that (a) Defendants
were not authorized to access Plaintiff's computer systems by sending
messages to Plaintiff's email server, (b) Defendants were not authorized to
use Plaintiff's servers to relay alleged messages when sending the alleged
emails, (c) Defendants knowingly and without permission used or caused to
be used computer services of Plaintiff's computers by allegedly sending
alleged messages, (d) Defendants knowingly and without permission
accessed and without permission added data to Plaintiff's computer systems
by allegedly sending the alleged email messages, (e) Defendants knowingly
and without permission accessed and without permission accessed and caused
to be accessed Plaintiff's computer, computer system, and computer networks
by allegedly sending the alleged email messages, ...
In simple terms, Plaintiff claims that Defendant took unauthorized control over
Plaintiff's computers using a distributed coordinated attack [11] (a.k.a., a botnet)
and, in doing so, trespassed and caused harm.
In this paper, the issues of attribution of Plaintiff-identified messages to
Defendant are irrelevant and further details in this area will be eschewed. The
issues associated with trespass to chattels has been examined in legal detail [10]
and in technical detail [7] elsewhere. The remaining issues then ultimately come
down to “knowing”, permission or the lack thereof, access, and access causing
identified damages.
Details of issues

Issues of permission
In the matter at hand, authorization for normal external use of simple mail transfer
protocol (SMTP)[4][6] and domain name server (DNS)[5] services was granted
de-facto by the open and unlimited access granted by Plaintiff to anyone from
anywhere to (1) retrieve DNS records and (2) send electronic mail messages using
the SMTP protocol. No other relevant authorization was involved in this matter.
The traces proffered by Plaintiff indicate that the HELO protocol was in use in
many or most messages. The HELO protocol and details of its proper reception
and application are defined in RFC821.[4] In some cases the EHLO protocol was
used as defined in RFC2821.[6]
Plaintiff claimed that such authorization was for the exclusive purpose of sending
messages that Plaintiff desired to get, but in practice, there was no way for an
external party to differentiate such a thing, and no explicit authorization was made
for such use. Rather, the service was made available to all. This is a legal issue,
not a technical one, and it was not sustained for Plaintiff by the court. Subsequent
legal rulings have indicated that technically authorized behavior are authorized in
the more general sense, and this would tend to support this interpretation.

Issues of knowledge
Depending on the specific statutes, knowledge may be codified in different ways.
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For the issues at hand, we will assume that knowledge constitutes knowledge of
the acts undertaken and not of the consequences of those acts. This greatly favors
Plaintiff in this case, and an alternative analysis based on knowledge of the
consequences asserted as damaging might also be explored. That alternative is not
explored herein.

Issues of access
The issue of access is key to this matter, and more specifically, the issues of (1)
what access is granted and not granted through the permission, and (2) whether
and to what extent that access was exceeded.
Issues of causing identified harm
The issue of causality in this analysis is not simply an issue of an event sequence
that started with the transmission of a message and resulted in identified harm.
The overall event sequence within which any such event sequence lies is also at
issue.
For example, if Plaintiff installed and configured their system so as to produce
large quantities of log files and chose to store those log files in locations where
they disrupted other operations, then any asserted claim of harm would, at a
minimum, be shared by Plaintiff and Defendant.
To the extent that such acts were not within the normal acts of a party such as
Plaintiff, or to the extent that Plaintiff failed to meet diligence standards with
regard to such configurations, liability might fall entirely with Plaintiff. For
example, a Plaintiff who captured complete Ethernet traffic logs and stored them
on a floppy disk along with the critical data generated by their email system
would surely run out of space quickly and could not reasonably claim to be
operating as a normal Internet Service Provider.

Issues of what constitutes harm and its quantity.
Analysis of damages is not the subject of this paper, however, it may have to meet
a threshold for legal purposes, and be quantifiable, time limited, and of a legally
identified type in order to be accepted by the courts. This issue is covered in more
detail in [7].
Basis of the claims
Plaintiff asserted evidence consisted of, (1) a collection of asserted traces of
electronic mail messages from Plaintiff's computers, (2) depositions, declarations,
reports, and other similar documents by parties and their experts but none by 3rd
parties or their representatives, (3) depictions of how a user might see alleged
messages, (4) a spreadsheet listing apparent asserted claims, (5) a file containing
what is apparently statistics of some sort, and (6) a file containing what was
asserted to be contemporaneous notes by Plaintiff. Note that none of these include
any traces extracted from from any computer not in Plaintiff's infrastructure, such
as traces from originating computers or intermediate computers involved in the
sending of the alleged messages.
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ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES IN THIS MATTER
Following the general layout of the analysis provided above, in order to establish
control or a lack thereof, the analysis starts by examining direct control.
Is direct control by Defendant demonstrated?
In order to establish direct control{1.1}, for each relevant interface, system, or
mechanism at issue, special {1.1.1 or 2} and general purpose {1.1.3 or 4} are
differentiated, normal and control envelope exceeding use are differentiated {.1 or
2 OR .3 or .4}, and the analysis proceeds.

The mechanisms are special purpose
The analysis method differentiates between general- (i.e., if it can emulate a
(finite) Turing Machine, as described in [9]) and special-purpose (lacking that
ability) mechanisms, devices, operating environments, programs, and interfaces.
In the matter at hand, general purpose computers were in use by Plaintiff, but
claims in this case were made only with regard to normal external interface use of
the simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP)[4] and domain name service (DNS) [5]
protocols on their normal ports, and in quantities and timings consistent with the
normal design and operating parameters of Plaintiff's systems. {1.1.1 and 1.1.3}
From [3] as detailed above, and upon examination of the protocols identified, the
mechanisms available to Defendant through SMTP[4] and DNS[5] are special
purpose.{1.1.1} In particular, neither SMTP nor DNS protocols allow storage and
retrieval of content through the protocol, a necessary but not sufficient
requirement for finite Turing equivalent computation. DNS only returns a predefined subset of what was sent to it along with stored data not under the control
of the protocol user and is a stateless protocol. SMTP has similar constraints
except that it includes a TCP state and several bits of state associated with
progress through the protocol, but this state cannot be used to store and retrieve
substantial data because the FSMs of the SMTP protocol respond with only fixed
responses based on state, each selected from only a few possibilities, and the
SMTP protocol does not provide for any operations other than those that move
from state to state (i.e., no logical operations such as AND, OR, etc.). This then
implies “For special purpose mechanisms, no matter what the intent of the person
ultimately responsible for the input, in normal operation, the mechanism can only
carry out the intent of the designers as expressed by the implementation and
configuration.”[3] Both of the mechanisms at issue, in normal use, are special
purpose. {1.1.1}

The control envelope was not apparently exceeded
The analysis method differentiates between normal use {1.1.1} and use that
exceeds the normal control envelope of the special purpose interface. {1.1.2} In
the case of an SMTP server or DNS server, the envelope of normal use for an
Internet Service Provider (ISP), which Plaintiff asserts he is, includes some
quantity of requests that are unfruitful to the ISP. Courts have ruled that ISPs have
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a duty to scale their infrastructure so as to accept some such level of requests, and
that it is part of the nature of the Internet that some such requests will be
misdirected, erroneous, or otherwise present.
In this case, no evidence was provided nor claims made that Defendant or anyone
acting on behalf of Defendant exceeded the normal control envelope of the
identified protocols{~1.1.2}, that the volume involved was excessive {~1.1.1.3}
or even that it was a significant percentage of the normal traffic in Plaintiff's
servers. Further, Plaintiff configured his servers so as to accept requests directed
toward non-existent accounts, so that traffic that would otherwise not have been
sent was in fact sent and this appears to be responsible for all asserted messages
proffered.

Direct control was not demonstrated
Thus the analysis is restricted to identifying whether or to what extent traces are
present to evidence (1) the use of syntax elements that could cause the identified
effects, {1.1.1.2} and (2) that such use of such syntax elements, if there was any,
had the effects asserted. {1.1.1.3}
The use of syntax elements
In examining the syntax elements of the SMTP and DNS protocols [4][5][6] I
found no syntax that would allow Defendant or anyone else using the external
interfaces to the SMTP or DNS services to affect direct control over storage
space, processing methods in use, resource allocation, use of systems not
including the receiving servers themselves, memory usage or allocation,
maintenance functions, monitoring, or risk management decisions. {!1.1.1.2}
Thus there was no way, for example, for Defendant or anyone else using such
interface to enable or disable logging, filtering, storage, allocations, priorities, or
anything else of that sort. {!1.1.1.3}
Even if there were such a capability, (e.g., at a low-level, packet prioritization
may be in effect in some routing infrastructure), no traces were provided to
indicate that any such methods were used so as to alter the use levels defined by
the configuration in the computer that was defined by Plaintiff's sole acts.
{~1.1.1.2, ~1.1.1.3, ~1.1.2} Lacking any traces supportive of such acts, even if
syntax elements were available to support such acts, {if 1.1.2} no evidence is
apparently available {~1.1.2.1, ~1.1.2.2} to show that Defendant undertook any
such acts.

Evidence of effects
Lacking a syntax to express such a semantic as enabling or disabling logging,
filtering, storage, allocations, priorities, or anything else of that sort, there is no
associated semantic expressible by Defendant from the limited interface asserted
as used. {!(1.1.1.1 → 1.1.1.3) → !1.1.1.3} → {0.1}
However, even if there were such syntax, no traces were provided to indicate that
any such semantics were ever carried out by any mechanism Plaintiff asserts
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Defendant used. {~1.1.1.3} Lacking any traces supportive of such semantics, no
evidence is apparently available to show that Defendant caused such semantics to
be executed.
Was indirect control by Defendant demonstrated?
Plaintiff made no claim and demonstrated no mechanism by which indirect
effects of Defendant could have altered the normal control envelope of the
identified protocols. {~1.2.1} Thus the it is reasonable to conclude that no claims
or evidence support indirect control.{→ ~1.2} However, at best, Plaintiff's entire
claim is one of indirect control. Plaintiff claims, in essence, that by using the
interface in the normal fashion, indirect control was exerted that caused the
identified asserted damages. In order to evaluate indirect control, it is necessary to
start with a set of candidate mechanisms and, for each such mechanism, identify
whether and to what extent that mechanism provided control as identified in the
direct control approaches. Performing the same analysis on the indirect control
assertion that was provided without substantial trace or analysis as a basis, we
might use the following approach.

The mechanisms are special purpose
As discussed earlier, the indirect control mechanisms that might be asserted are
no more than all side effects of acts performed by the directly controlled
mechanisms. {1.2  ؿ1} Since all of the direct control mechanisms are special
purpose, so must be any indirect control paths, so long as the normal control
envelope was not exceeded. {1.1.1}
The control envelope was not exceeded
In this case, no claim was made in excess of the direct control envelope {~1.1.2},
no traces or evidence was given or asserted to support such a claim,{~1.1.2.1,
~1.1.2.2} and no uncovered paths or exploited weaknesses were asserted or
identified from traces.{~1.1.2.1.1 * ~1.1.2.1.2 → ~1.1.2.1} Lacking any of these,
there is no basis in the methodology for asserting or supporting special purpose
mechanisms operating in excess of normal control envelopes. {~1.1.2}
Plaintiff was in direct control of the mechanisms
In this case, Plaintiff owned and operated the server computers at issue, installed,
configured, and used the operating environments, software, configuration files,
settings, and all other aspects of the mechanisms asserted to have been accessed
and altered. To the extent that the analytical method is a valid approach to
analysis, it may reasonably be applied to all parties, and in this case, to Plaintiff.
We will use {P: …} to indicate Plaintiff control.

The mechanisms included general purpose ones
Plaintiff, through ownership and unlimited access to and control of the hardware,
was in possession and control of all of the mechanisms operating within those
environments. {P:1} Since these are general purpose computers with the finite
version of Turing capability, Plaintiff had general purpose use of those
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mechanisms.{P:1.1.3} In addition, Plaintiff had special purpose access to special
purpose interfaces and, at his sole discretion, could have altered such interfaces to
provide general purpose use to himself or others.{P:1.1.2} No traces were
provided to support or refute any such contention, if it were ever to be made.
{~P:1.1.2}

The mechanisms were in normal use by Plaintiff
Since Plaintiff owned the mechanisms at issue, there is no sense in which the
authorizations associated with its use could have been exceeded by Plaintiff. Even
if Plaintiff were to use uncovered paths or exploited weaknesses, such use
remained within Plaintiff's authority. {P:1.1.3. P:1.1.1}
Plaintiff's control envelope included claimed effects
The control envelope of general purpose unlimited access to all systems and
mechanisms at issue was sufficient for Plaintiff to have enabled or disabled
logging, controlled use of filtering, limited or controlled use of all areas of storage
and allocations, set any implementable priorities for operations, or anything else
of that sort. {P:1.1.3.1} With Plaintiff's authorized access, all of the syntax and
semantics required to invoke such control was directly available to Plaintiff at all
relevant times. {P: 1.1.3.1}
Claims evidence use of syntax and semantic effects
Plaintiff indicated that he configured the systems at issue, {P:1.1.3.2, 1.1.3.3}
including (1) installing operating environments and software that handled SMTP
and DNS requests, (2) placing storage for servicing of those requests and storage
of logs therefrom as he desired, (3) configuring such servers so as to log in excess
of default logging and thus increasing the storage associated with such logs, (4)
installing, configuring, and operating filtering technologies in use, (5) setting
priorities for operations of different services on the systems in use, and in excess
of default, and (6) authorizing receipt of electronic mail messages addressed to
user identities that did not otherwise exist on said systems so as to accept
messages, consume bandwidth, produce logs, store messages, and otherwise
consume resources that otherwise would not have been consumed.
At any time, Plaintiff could have altered any of these settings to limit damages,
prevent transmissions, eliminate logs, eliminate filtering, or otherwise limit
effects. But Plaintiff continued to operate these systems in this way over a period
of years. {P:1.1.3.1 and 1.1.3.2 and 1.1.3.3}
Using the same criteria as was used in the analysis of the claims made by Plaintiff
against Defendant, Plaintiff expressed intent to produce the effects asserted by
Plaintiff as violative by so configuring his system to produce these effects,
Plaintiff admits that he expressed such intent, and admits that his expressed intent
was acted upon by his systems and mechanisms. In addition, traces provided by
Plaintiff are consistent with that intent being expressed and acted upon. {P:1.1.3.1
* 1.1.3.2 * 1.1.3.3 → 1.1 → 1}
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By this analysis method, Plaintiff was in control of the systems at issue at the
times at issue.
Defendant had no control over non-server activities
Following the same analytical process, time and space consumption on servers
and systems not directly involved in the reception of traffic from Defendant can
similarly be ruled out in terms of intentional causation. In the matter at hand this
included claims regarding bandwidth used to download asserted messages, space
consumed on auxiliary systems, and time consumed in gathering the asserted
messages.

SMTP has no control over non-server activities
SMTP has no syntax expressing control over forwarding, downloading, backing
up, retrieving, or analyzing messages.{!1.1.1.1} Examination of [4] and [6]
evidences that no such protocol element exists and no claims of exceeding control
envelopes was made. {~1.1.2}
DNS has no control over non-server activities
DNS protocols have no syntax for expressing control over forwarding,
downloading, backing up, retrieving, or analyzing messages.{!1.1.1.1}
Examination of [5] evidences that no such protocol element exists, and no claims
of exceeding control envelopes was made. {~1.1.2}
Plaintiff was in control of non-server mechanisms
In this case, Plaintiff owned and operated the non-server computers at issue,
installed, configured, and used the operating environments, software,
configuration files, settings, and all other aspects of the mechanisms asserted to
have been accessed and altered. To the extent that the analytical method is a valid
approach to analysis, it may, again, reasonably be applied to all parties, and in this
case, to Plaintiff.

The mechanisms included general purpose ones
Plaintiff, through ownership and unlimited access to and control of the non-server
hardware, was in possession and control of all of the mechanisms operating
within those environments.{P:1} As general purpose computers with the finite
version of Turing capability, Plaintiff had general purpose use of those
mechanisms. {P:1.1.3}
The mechanisms were in normal use by Plaintiff
Since Plaintiff owned the mechanisms at issue, there is no sense in which the
authorizations associated with its use could have been exceeded by Plaintiff. Even
if Plaintiff were to use uncovered paths or exploited weaknesses, such use
remained within Plaintiff's authority. {P:1.1.3. P:1.1.1}
Plaintiff's control envelope included claimed effects
The control envelope of general purpose unlimited access to all systems and
mechanisms at issue was sufficient for Plaintiff to have enabled or disabled
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logging, controlled use of filtering, limited or controlled areas of storage and
allocations, used or not used bandwidth or processing power for any desired
function, set priorities for operations on any implementable basis, or anything else
of that sort. {P:1.1.3.1} With Plaintiff's authorized access, all of the syntax and
semantics required to invoke such control was directly available to Plaintiff at all
relevant times. {P:1.1.3.1}

Claims evidence use of syntax and semantic effects
Plaintiff indicated that he configured the systems at issue, {P:1.1.3.2, 1.1.3.3}
including, (1) installing the operating environments and software that stored,
transmitted, received, and processes the content in question, (2) placing storage
and processing power where he desired, (3) configuring systems and networks so
as to move content already identified by him or his systems as “spam” from place
to place, (4) storing multiple copies of “spam” in different places, (5) installing,
configuring, and operating filtering technologies in use so as to continue
processing, storing, and transmitting identified “spam” after it was so identified,
(6) setting priorities for operations of different services on the systems in use, and
(7) taking time to look at items that had already been definitively identified and
segregated by his systems as “spam”, all so as to consume bandwidth, produce
logs, store messages, and otherwise consume resources that otherwise would not
have been consumed.
At any time, Plaintiff could have altered any of these settings to limit damages,
prevent transmissions, eliminate logs, eliminate filtering, or otherwise limit
effects. But Plaintiff continued to operate these systems in this way over a period
of years. {P:1.1.3.1 and 1.1.3.2 and 1.1.3.3}
Using the same criteria as was used in the analysis of the claims made by Plaintiff
against Defendant, Plaintiff expressed the intent to produce the effects asserted by
Plaintiff as violative by so configuring his system to produce these effects,
Plaintiff admits that he expressed such intent, and admits that his expressed intent
was acted upon by his systems and mechanisms. In addition, traces provided by
Plaintiff are consistent with that intent being expressed and acted upon. {P:1.1.3.1
* 1.1.3.2 * 1.1.3.3→1.1.3→1.1→1}

By this analysis method, Plaintiff was in control of the systems at issue at the
times at issue.
AS REPORTED
As reported, the following summary conclusions were stated in this matter.
Indications in parens indicate what elements of the claims, identified in pertinent
parts above, are apparently refuted by the summary results. These conclusions are
presented in pertinent parts as well from documents in [8] and use language
identified within [3] and [7] to express results precisely:
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Plaintiff has not shown that any breakin occurred anywhere or that his
systems were taken control of
“I have found no reliable scientific or technical basis in any of the information I
have been provided to support any claim that the physical infrastructure was
interfered with, that any alteration or forgery of any IP address took place, that
any alteration or forgery of any TCP or UDP datagram took place, or that any
alteration of any DNS or email system, request, or response took place in this
matter...
It appears that none of the sorts of vulnerabilities or attack mechanisms known
and widely discussed within the computer security community were in any way
involved in anything claimed by Plaintiff in this case and that Plaintiff does not
assert that Defendants exploited any vulnerability or weakness or used such any
mechanism to attack Plaintiff's systems.
I found no reliable scientific or technical basis ... to support the claim that the
[messages] or Defendants took control of Plaintiff's computer.
Plaintiff could easily have refused [messages] based on any number of criteria if
[they] were in any way determined to be illegitimate or not appropriate to
reception, but failed to do so. Plaintiff's servers were, apparently, configured to
accept [messages] not [addressed to] users of his systems, but rather for the sole
purpose of authorizing and inviting messages not bound for such users. … If this
were not so, the [messages] would and could never have been sent. In all cases, it
appears that Plaintiff's computers were only carrying out the intent expressed in
the input to the extent that it was within the intent of the designers and the
constraints of the implementation and configuration, which was under the sole
control of Plaintiff. In step after step, Plaintiff apparently configured his
computers so as to choose to accept the [messages] stating (literally) "OK" and
only granted permission to send the [messages] after going through multiple
control steps for each ... This does not appear to me to meet the definition of
"take" or "control" by anyone other than Plaintiff.
It appears that Plaintiff in this case had access to and had the ability to perform
analysis of information reflective of the operation of his system and to adjust its
allocation of space, time, and other resources, to control what was and was not
logged, stored, retained, and disposed of, to change prioritization of different
processes within those systems to meet his desired operational needs, to control
which email addresses accepted email messages, which areas of disk and memory
were used to store what, which software was run, and every other aspect of what
resources were used in what ways within his systems. Defendants did not have
even the ability to express any desires related to the control of these things
through the interfaces provided by Plaintiff, and thus had no control over any of
these things. Under his sole control and at his sole discretion, Plaintiff decided to
maintain or adjust his systems so as to produce the results produced by his
systems, and expressed that desire and control by authorizing all of these things as
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expressed by his configuration of his systems in the manner and fashion so as to
produce the results he got.
Plaintiff has failed to show and has denied the ability to show that anyone sent the
[messages] through intermediary computers by illegally breaking into any
computers used to send those messages to Plaintiff. (1(d)) It appears that
Plaintiff's authorized programs, mechanisms, and configurations were in
continuous control over the actions of Plaintiff's computers at all times, and only
Plaintiff's knowing and intentional acts authorized any alleged emails to be sent to
Plaintiff. (2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), 4(d), 4(e))”
Plaintiff system operation was unimpaired
“Plaintiff in this case had sole control over the priorities set within the server and
workstation for the execution of the various services at issue and other programs
and services operating within those systems.
To the extent that one process was prioritized over another or that one sort of
operation was performed while another was not, this was based on Plaintiff's
configurations of Plaintiff's systems, and was apparently under Plaintiff's sole
control.
Plaintiff expressed his intent with regard to the services he provided by allocating
different priorities and resources for different processes and mechanisms
operating within his servers, and those servers apparently carried out his
expressed intent.
Plaintiff, at any time, could have expressed different intent, including without
limit, by (1) disabling [messages] sent to the email addresses that he configured
for the purpose of receiving the [messages], (2) changing storage allocation, (3)
changing priorities associated with processing, or (4) through any number of other
available methods under his sole control.
I found no reliable scientific or technical basis in any of the information I have
been provided to support the claim that the [messages] in any way impaired the
operation of Plaintiff's computers.
It appears that all of the alleged acts associated with sending the [messages]
identified by Plaintiff in this matter are part and parcel of the process by which
email is processed by computers configured and intended to receive such
messages by Plaintiff. (2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 2(h), 2(i), 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 4(a), 4(b),
4(c), 4(d), 4(e))”
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The notion of control as discussed in [3] was applied to evaluate the claims of, in
effect, "knowingly and without permission", "access", and "cause damage". This
case study shows how the methodology of [3] can be and was applied to issues in
a specific legal matter and how its application results in resolution of issues with
regard to control. The paper, while not fully covering all possibilities from [3]
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shows both a demonstration of control and demonstration of non-control, in this
case showing that Plaintiff had control and Defendant did not.
It appears that the methodology of [3] is usable for the purpose it was intended for
and that its application can be used to bring technical clarity to the legal questions
at hand. However, there are clearly limitations to this approach. It depends on
analysis that is non-trivial to undertake. While the particular case studied was
readily resolvable in these terms, other cases may not be. The analysis also
depends on the different theories of the case, and as such, it is useful for bringing
light to the legal theories and their technical limits.
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